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D-R-A-F-T
25X1A9a [REDACTED]:sap
4 April 1966

SUBJECT: Intelligence Support of Operational Planning

1. Problem: To assess DDI policy on the production of intelligence in support of operational planning.

2. Facts bearing on the problem:

a. There is no DDI Notice or other formal instruction regarding the specialized intelligence required by the DDP.

b. Among the missions and functions statements of the various DDI offices, only that of OBI covers the subject of support to DDP. The OBI statement (as derived from the original ORR statement) reads, "Provide for geographic research in support of CIA operations and intelligence production...." (HR 1-13c, 16 August 1963).

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c. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] established in Fall 1962, is headed by a DDI officer. Three additional DDI officers occupy slots in the 17-man T/O. The Center serves as a coordination point for provision of the specialized support required for paramilitary operations planned or undertaken by [REDACTED] and the Area Divisions, maintains a central repository of pertinent classified material, and provides some in-house and external research capabilities. 25X1A8a

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d. A study of [REDACTED] done in 1964 for Director, BPAM viewed with favor [REDACTED] role as "broker for intelligence requirements in support of special operations". The Inspector General's 1965 report [REDACTED] 25X1A8a concluded that "...paramilitary and counterinsurgency operations are peculiarly susceptible to intelligence support by the intelligence-

Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP79-01153A000100120004-4 [REDACTED] ...is now 25X1A8a

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operating on sound principles....as the coordinator and broker of requirements in support of special operations...."

e. OPPB's Planning, Assumptions, Goals, and Objectives, dated January 1966, excludes operations planning support as an Objective under "Production of Intelligence". Similarly, the "CIA Program/Budget Structure" as outlined in the Combined Program Call, FY 1967-FY 1972, January 1966, limits response on operations support line items to "DDP components".

3. Discussion:

a. Intelligence support to operational planning is provided by all DDI production offices. Only in OBI and IAD/NPTC, however, is there an extensive support program. OBI's program arises from the natural need of operations planners, particularly those in the para-military field, for basic geographic data and analysis. IAD's technical photo-interpretation talents lend themselves similarly to DDP needs. Support activities elsewhere among the production offices consists mainly of spot summaries of data and evaluations in response to incidental DDP requests.

b. It is questionable whether the DDI-DDP relationship is a very good one. Services provided by DDI units other than OBI and IAD might be more evident and the OBI-IAD support work might be more effective were there enthusiasm generally in the DDI and the DDP toward working with one another. Generally speaking, however, ^{the} attitude of each has been more hostile than favorable. The habit seems to have emerged in the very beginning of the Agency, when the DDP assumed a haughty

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detachment from the DDI and other outsiders and was repaid in kind by a haughtiness on the part of the DDI, which deprecated the importance of operational tasks as opposed to its intelligence reporting responsibilities. These attitudes certainly discouraged close working associations, and are probably responsible for the absence in Agency regulations of an acknowledgement of a DDI-DDP support relationship and in the DDI of guidelines regarding its proper scope.

c. O/DDI guidance on support of operational planning has been casual and equivocal. Under Mr. Amory, for example, major operations-support work undertaken by Geography Division was recognized, but not encouraged, nor disapproved. Mr. Amory remained suspicious of the ability of operational personnel and of the worth of their programs, and he admonished his people to exercise care and moderation in responding to DDP requests. He did ~~not~~ or could not, provide specific policy guidelines or instrumentalities that would facilitate maintaining more suitable relationships. Mr. Cline's outlook was essentially the same: analysts should not divert attention away from their proper mission to support operations except in ad hoc, patently important cases. An articulation of this view is contained in a 1962 memo to the Executive Director on the subject of DDI participation in DDP intelligence handbook production (subsequently, the Intelligence Handbook for Special Operations): "...we do not

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believe that components of the DDI Area should commit themselves to the preparation of materials tailored specifically as operational support papers, since DDP officers are surely more aware of operational needs. I can assure you, however, that appropriate analysts of DDI components will be available for substantive consultation on points that may arise with respect to the preparation of support papers, and we will whenever feasible cover subjects of interest to DDP in our regular publications."

d. This view ignored what was already going on regularly in Geography Division and IAD, and occasionally in Cartography Division and the ERA. The original philosophy of DDI and DDP as essentially separate agencies was no longer valid. ^{Although} The DDP had been (as it still is) encouraged to develop and depend on its own intelligence support capacities, ~~These capacities necessarily~~ lacked both the professionalism and the informational resources available in the DDI, and ^{Resort to} DDI aid became inevitable. The creation of ^{in 1962} [redacted] formalized the matter. 25X1A8a

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e. [redacted] immediate predecessor, [redacted]

[redacted] had been a notoriously poor substitute for DDI resources. ~~and its~~ demise, brought on by Mr. Amory's complaint about its products in the 20 March 1962 Deputies' meeting, led directly to the concept of a broadly capable DDP intelligence support center in which the DDI would participate. Following [redacted] request for aid in September 1962, the DD/I assigned [redacted] (OCI) to take over and reorganize the TAB unit. In time, [redacted]

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25X1A8a (OBI) succeeded [REDACTED] as Chief and 3 additional DDI officers were recruited for [REDACTED] ^A the favorable assessment made 2 years later by BPAM concluded, however, that [REDACTED] should remain a broker ~~and avoid~~ despite the opportunities for slipping into the production of intelligence. 25X1A8a "This must not be allowed to happen, and the DD/I must maintain the responsibility for production of intelligence." An investigation by the IG a year later concluded that "the concept of an intelligence support center [REDACTED] is a valid one" but that 25X1A8a "....it should not itself become a producing or research unit." DDI management, in other words, should also be involved. 25X1A8a

25X1A9a f. An overview and counseling of [REDACTED] was actually maintained by the O/DDI in the person of [REDACTED] for a short while in late 1962 and early 1963. Following [REDACTED] reassignment to Collection 25X1A9a Guidance Staff, however, the overview ceased. It was not reinstituted despite recommendations of the Geographic Research Area and a June 1963 25X1A9a memo: [REDACTED] requesting a "formal DD/I sponsor." 25X1A9a What [REDACTED] had in mind would seem still to apply: an O/DDI officer to "act as a point of representation and counsel for the DDI offices and for the Center should problems arise in their relationships which cannot be resolved on the working level"; and to facilitate "recruitment of suitable DDI personnel for [REDACTED] staff." It was additionally 25X1A8a proposed that DDI personnel in [REDACTED] would be placed under the jurisdiction of a separate career board attached to the DDI's staff to assure fair and uniform career handling. ~~This request also was not acted on~~

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g. Although its charter calls for it, [REDACTED] does not actually control all requirements for intelligence support of paramilitary operations planning. Individual Area Divisions and case officers periodically still work directly with their DDI suppliers, and to some degree will appropriately continue to do so. DDI offices tend, however, to keep [REDACTED] apprised of direct contacts so that requirements aren't duplicated. DDP requirements in the fields of economic action, political action, propaganda and psywar, ^{and} collection operations are more frequently met within the DDP organization. In the absence of explicit DDI policy on provision of support to operations planning, office responsiveness in these cases seems particularly dependent on the outlook of the supervisor or analyst concerned.

h. The main problem arising from the lack of formal DDI guidance on support of operations planning is that it deters good program management. In the special case of [REDACTED] it ignores a going organization and the DDI resources assigned to it. In a sense, the situation is as though there were no acknowledgement of, or policy guidance for, the

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DDI Representative [REDACTED] Lack of guidance specifically leads to inconsistent planning and programming by production elements, invites sloppy and unprofessional work by analysts not personally persuaded of a case officer's importance, encourages the DDP and DDI offices to depend on their own wits, and retards the appearance of additional instrumentalities ^{which} ~~which~~ might render better order between the DDI and the DDP.

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4. Conclusions:

a. A statement of DDI policy on the expenditure of production resources in support of operational planning should be prepared. The statement ~~should encourage such expenditures~~, provide guidelines as to scope and priority (perhaps by production office), and describe applicable procedures.

b. The CIA Program/Budget Structure should be revised to show DDI production ^{responsibility} ~~activity~~ in support of operations planning.

c. A senior DDI staff officer should be appointed as counsel and monitor for [REDACTED]. As monitor, the officer would serve to assure the unit's professional competence and the harmony of its internal and external research activities ~~any~~ with DDI needs and capabilities. As counselor, the officer would provide a point of decision for the DDI offices and for [REDACTED] should problems arise which cannot be resolved on the working level. He would also facilitate recruitment of x suitable DDI personnel for [REDACTED] and contribute a single DDI voice in matters regarding the orientation and program of [REDACTED]. The officer would assume a similar role with respect to other liaison-coordination instrumentalities as might develop.

5. Recommendations:

a. The DD/I initiate discussions with the DD/P seeking common policy on the appropriate working relationship(s) between the two Directorates, on procedures and instrumentalities for conducting these relationships, and on existing problems that should be dealt with.

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b. An officer in O/DD/I be appointed to function as ~~DDI~~ coordinator of DDI relations with the DDP including guidance and support requirements of [REDACTED] 25X1A8a

c. OPPB be advised to include in the next Planning Assumptions, Goals, and Objectives a citation of "operations planning support" as an Objective under "Production of Intelligence"; similarly, to include in the next Combined Program Call a citation of "suitable DDI Components" as a line item under "Operations Support."

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